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The Non-Perplexity of Human Rights. 
 
Jayan Nayar 
 
 
Abstract. 
What do we (think we) speak about when we speak of Human Rights? Mostly we think that we speak of the fate 
of the vulnerable Human-being in her beingness in the world. Given this assumption, three recurring perplexities- of 
territoriality, parochiality-imperiality and coloniality – appear to preoccupy much critical thinking on the subject. I 
suggest a different reason underpins the invention and operation of Human Rights. I argue that Human Rights, as 
a (post)colonial technology of subjectification, operates in perverse coherence, to rationalize and regulate the global 
(b)ordering of differentiated subject-beingness: of license, containment and abandonment. As such efforts that aim to 
rescue Human Rights for the human-subject merely reinforce the adaptive operations of global governmentality to 
norm-alise and resettle the World. Against this I suggest a return to an anti-colonial philosophical orientation of 
desubjectification.  
 
 
What Do We (Think We) Speak About When We Speak of ‘Human’ Rights?  
 
Much is said and written on Human Rights. With the best of intentions. And an abundance of 
anguish. For all the talk of this being the ‘Age of Rights’,1 the everyday, the banal, the painful truth 
of Human Rights is that being ‘Human’ in the world is embroiled still in the normalities of inflicted 
cruelty and deprivation. As Upendra Baxi pointedly reminds us, ‘[o]ne may … be human without 
having food to eat, water to drink, a shelter to live in, and a human agency fully deprived.’2 
 
And so we see, much critical thinking on the subject of Human Rights is moved to find ways to 
bridge this divide between the proclaimed aspirations and the grounded actualities of being 
Human. Proliferation however does not equate with clarity. From the rich and diverse literature 
we observe that the more that is said about Human Rights, the less certain its meaning becomes; 
indeed, it has been noted that the universal ‘fact of Human Rights is marked by it ‘intellectual 
promiscuity’,3 the ‘irony’ of its ‘universality’, its ‘fragmentation’ in meaning, effects and aims.4 Many 
registers of Human Rights have after all been identified,5 and in so many disciplinary dialects are 
arguments about Human Rights conducted, truths propounded, judgements made, often in 
conversations with little reference one with another. The hope, presumably, is that all this 
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continued contemplation, conversation, debate, clarification, serves a useful purpose, to bring 
clarity, coherence, perhaps even truth and energy, towards…what?  
 
Whilst it might appear to be a venture into the obvious, precisely because it appears to be so 
obvious, I begin by asking the following: what do we (think we) speak about when we speak of ‘Human 
Rights’?  
 
It seems to me we have somewhat assumed the obviousness of the answer: we speak of the fate of the 
(venerable, vulnerable) ‘Human’ subject being-in-the-world, as subject in-the-world, in being-fully-in-the-world, in 
justice and well-being. Take Gearty and Douzinas, for example: 
 
‘Human rights inscribe in law and remind law of its necessary and impossible commitment 
to an unconditional justice.’6 
 
Or, Jack Donelly: 
 
‘[H]uman rights are a social practice that aims to realize a particular vision of human dignity 
and potential by institutionalizing certain rights.’7 
 
Or, Upendra Baxi: 
 
‘[T]he prime function of contemporary human rights theory is to persuade oneself and 
everyone in a territorially bounded society/community that the human is that entity to which 
everyone owes duties of equal respect and full recognition of worth, regardless of sex, 
religion, race, residence and like features.’8 
 
These are indeed thinkers from quite different ideological and political orientations and it is not 
my intention to suggest that they in any way speak the same language of Human Rights. And yet, 
notwithstanding their many differences we see they share a common conviction - that Human 
Rights pertains to the condition of human being-ness - and it is this that interests me. Examples 
of such statements on the underlying ‘human’ content of Human Rights – even as it is ‘betrayed’, 
more so because it is betrayed – are plentiful, notable for their apparent assumption of the 
obviousness of this truth.9 Hence, abundant in the critical literature are the incessant efforts to 
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engage with perplexities and paradoxes, betrayals and challenges, towards some recovery of a  true 
possibility of/for Human Rights in the face of the inhumanities of the human condition.10  
 
Three themes recur, it seems to me, as the backdrop to these many meditations: 
 
1) The territoriality of ‘universal’ Human Rights: the post-Arendtian realisation that rather than 
applying to all Humans by virtue of some universal quality of being Human, the concept 
is inescapably linked to state-territorial contexts of political belonging and its rationalities 
of inclusions and exclusions, rights and rightlessness.11 The question that follows is how 
to (re)think Human Rights out of the bordered geopolitics of inclusion and exclusion in a 
world of a globalised, territorially-bounded and segregated ‘sovereign’ state system? 
 
2) The parochiality and imperiality of Human Rights: the ‘postcolonial’ recognition that rather 
than embracing all of Human-beingness in its infinite diversity, the concept is bound by 
Eurocentric onto-epistemologies of (Hu)Man, and as such is complicit in the continuing 
violence of othering and dehumanisation.12 The question that follows is how to (re)think 
Human Rights through other ‘pluriversal’ epistemological lenses that open up Humanity 
from the closures of coloniality (of racism, patriarchy and hetero-sexism). 
 
3) The governmentality of Human Rights: the post-Foucauldian/Agambenian realisation that 
whilst the language and practice of rights might enable assertions of subjectivity – of 
recognition and redistribution – these are determined by extant rationalities of economic 
domination, bureaucratic management/enforcement and judicial determination that 
comprise the complex totality of biopolitical governmentality.13 The question that follows 
is how to (re)think Human Rights out of the biopolitical traps of governmentality that 
return transformatory assertions of emancipation to the regulatory logics of management 
and control? 
 
In short, the critical Human Rights thinker is burdened thus: how to balance the ever-pervasive 
anguish over the ‘facts’ of Human Rights betrayed with the continuing hope regarding its perceived 
promise? Ratna Kapur provides an eloquent, moving response:  
 
‘My critique of human rights in intended to be productive and to articulate a different 
cosmology within which to understand the place of human rights in our contemporary 
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world. …the battle to recapture the progressive and transformative terrain of human rights cannot 
be simply ‘won’, but the centring of excluded subjects, excluded zones and excluded histories can bring 
the project back to a space of greater optimism and lesser despair. Ultimately, it is an effort 
to put some life back into a project in desperate need of resuscitation and to give this body a soul.’14 
 
Thus concern for the Human and her vulnerability – her full beingness as such – remains presumed 
as founding the invention and authorship of Human Rights, the assumption is that the struggle 
for the humanity of the Human (however conceptualised, however ascribed) remains at core the 
intent of Human Rights, to be protected from dilution, to be rescued from betrayal, to be liberated 
from perplexity. It must be so, or so we assume. This is perhaps the reason why, to the hopeful 
Human Rights thinker, Hannah Arendt’s aporetic insights into the tautology of Human Rights is 
so troubling, and why Giogio Agamben’s subsequent equation of Human Rights with the 
biopolitical inscription of ‘bare life’ into subjectivity under sovereignty so disturbing.15 This is then 
also why possible rescue from such philosophical (let alone existential) despair are so eagerly 
embraced; why we may be comforted by Peter Fitzpatrick’s thesis of ‘indeterminacy’ which asserts 
that the emancipatory possibilities of Human Rights meanings are never fully ‘contained’ even as 
they are subject to power’s sovereignty of judgement;16 why we may find inspiring Upendra Baxi’s 
assertion of a ‘right to be Human’,17 and his delineation of a struggle-based insurgent politics for 
Human Rights in opposition to the bureaucratic and governmental machinations of the politics of 
Human Rights;18 why we might keenly embrace Jacques Ranciere’s elegant rescue of the dissensual 
‘subject of the Rights of Man’;19 why also we increasingly witness a move away from any search 
for ‘foundational’ or ontological groundings, in favour of praxiological assertions of Human Rights 
as political action, always contextual, always in paradoxical tension, never really having to explain 
away the perplexities that appear to confound the idea.20 But the problems persist. 
 
For all these diverse efforts of reimagination and recovery, we know that the everyday regimes of 
cruelty and dispossession operate in actual worlds of normalised power, not in intellectual theatres 
of idealised and choreographed Human Rights imagination and exhortation.21 To acknowledge 
this actuality of wrongs is not to deny the ‘fact’ of Human Rights; quite the opposite. Human 
Rights does indeed operate in the world; indeed it is critical to the operation of this World. For 
many the perceived distance between the presumed promise of Human Rights and the actualities 
of wrongs and suffering remains understood as betrayal, a perplexity, the very impetus for rescue 
and for greater efforts toward redemption.22 I understand it differently. Setting aside the ‘culture 
of sentimentality’,23 and our ‘mourning’ for the perceived betrayals of Human Rights,24 I think it 
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important to ask again the question that Talal Asad posed: what do Human Rights do in the 
world?25 I intend in this essay to address precisely this matter. 
 
My argument begins by understanding Human Rights as a philosophical invention, imagined 
within the exigencies of the world. What Human Rights do in the world therefore is intrinsic to its 
very invention. Viewed in this way, Human Rights is understood as having emerged into the 
possibilities of imagination not out of metaphysical abstraction but material contingency, not out 
of any quest or desire for some metaphysical-political truth of the ‘Human-subject’, not for the 
ascription of some universal ‘equality’ or ‘freedom’ or ‘dignity’ or ‘justice’, but as an onto-
epistemological norm-ing of the world of social relations. In what follows, I challenge the 
assumption that the essential reason of Human Rights concerns the venerability and vulnerability 
of the ‘Human’-subject. In my view, the sense of perplexity, paradox, betrayal, that follow critical 
engagements with the operation of Human Rights all result from a fundamental categorical error: 
that the fate of the ‘Human’-subject lies at the core of the intent of Human Rights.26 Rather, a 
more mundane, and profane, reason dictates the inscription of ‘Rights’ onto the ‘Human’, a reason 
that continues to coherently inform the materiality of the operation of Human Rights, as fact, in 
and of the colonial-modern world.27 
 
Human Rights, I argue, is concerned with the reason of (b)ordering; it operates to differentiatedly 
(b)order the coloniality of power/being in the world. By (b)ordering, I mean a system of 
inscriptions and emplacements which define the structures that regulate and enforce ‘Human’-
beingness-in-the-world. (B)ordering in this sense is the combined operation of both discursive 
disciplines (the invention/discoveries of categorical names, ‘theories’ of associational meanings, 
vocabularies of (un)belonging and govern-ment etc) and physical practices (the erection and 
policing of borders/fences/walls etc) that configure the World as known and understood as being. 
And by coloniality - which is more than just the ‘parochiality’ of the Eurocentric ‘history’ and 
epistemology28 - I mean the operation of power/knowledge as a totalizing structure that normalises 
and enforces the World (fully as one World) of inscribed  (differentiated) subject-beingness.29 My 
argument therefore can be stated as follows: from its origins in the ‘natural law’ of conquests and 
its subsequent reinvention in its ‘Enlightenment’-form of propertied-Rights, through to its 
‘universalisation’ and ‘globalisation’ within the post UN Charter imagination, to its present 
neoliberal trade-related, market-friendly manifestations (as Baxi has aptly summed it),30 the 
subjectification of (Hu)Man through ‘Rights’ has served as a colonial-modern technology that 
constructs and rationalises a (globalised) regime of (b)ordering bodies differentiatedly (made to be)-
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in-the-World’. Simply, Human Rights is an invention not of the inclusion of all humanity as equal, 
but of its enforced differentiation. Contrary to much Human Rights theology therefore, there is 
not one (reified, idealized) universal subject of/for Human Rights awaiting a becoming or 
redemption. Instead the invention of Human Rights, as a technology of ‘right-ing’ the Human-
(made-)subject,31 enables the colonial-modern (b)ordering of a threefold differentiated materiality 
of unequal being-ness in the world: of license, containment, and abandonment. This, I argue, is the work 
of Human Rights to do. 
 
This argument I make regarding Human Rights is not however intended as an advocacy of futility. 
More may be told of stories of resistance than the imagination and vocabulary of Human Rights 
allow. It is often the case that we mistake, and equate, human struggle with the struggle for Human 
Rights. Hence we see the ready subsumption of diverse human refusals against operations of 
dispossession and subjugation by well-intentioned Human Rights thinkers/workers into registers 
of subjectification: the critical Human Rights thinker is often preoccupied with the presumed 
emancipatory possibility of ‘becoming-subject’ into the ‘political’ space. It is this work of 
subjectification that is presumed to be the onto-epistemological labour of Human Rights to 
perform. In the concluding section of the essay, I present a different reading of struggle to 
supplement my argument, one which does not suffer the anxiety that Human Rights exhausts the 
possibilities of human futures. Instead I hint at an anti-colonial orientation of desubjectification that 
might better enable us to oppose the totalizations of global coloniality.   
 
A Different Telling of the Origin-Story.32 
 
My argument begins with an understanding of Human Rights as a socio-political and legal 
technology in the world rather than as imagination and expression of some reified ‘World Spirit’ 
in History.33 As I argue it, Human Rights is born out of, and constantly evolves through, the 
exigencies of (continuing) coloniality; the theory-practice of Human Rights operates as an onto-
epistemological framework that rationalises, norm-alises and enforces a reified human-beingness 
that is subject to, and bordered by, the institutional structures of global accumulation, 
(re)distribution and dispossession. Human Rights therefore is co-constitutive (along with the 
territorial concept of ‘sovereignty – see below) of the contemporary institutional structure and 
legal operation of the state-territorial global system. In this regard the evolutionary nature of 
Human Rights, its capacity for reinvention through time, its ‘intellectual promiscuity’, its 
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‘fragmentation’, are all central to its function as an ever-adaptive and reflexive technology of 
(b)ordering.  
 
1) The Invention of ‘Discovery’, the naming of (In)Humanity, and the License of ‘Sovereignty’. 
 
We are concerned here with a story of populations and territories. As a start, it is useful to travel 
farther back than the great ‘European’ revolutions of the 18th century to revisit the much discussed 
debate on the ‘Human’ between Bartholome de Las Casas and Juan Gines de Sepulveda (and we 
add to this the later ruminations of Francisco de Vitoria and Francisco Suarez), so central to most 
critical, post-colonial, anti-imperial, tellings of the violent story of human wrongs.34 This tale, as is 
oft-told, narrates the colonial pasts of International Law, to unveil the ‘dehumanisation’ of the 
encountered populations deemed Other to imperial Europe, and to demonstrate the significance 
of the postcolonial struggle to be Human, as it were. What is less considered in the discussions on 
origins and foundation is that the debate on the idea of the Human as an ontological category here 
takes place in conjunction with, and as a response to a prior philosophical problem: how to 
rationalise, and norm-alise, expansive acquisition and rule over the ‘encountered’ bodies and 
territories of the rich ‘New World’ now ‘discovered’.35 In other words, the debate surrounding the 
‘Human’, in these formative moments of colonial-modernity, is significant less because it was a 
discussion on the ontological nature of the imagined ‘Self’ and the encountered ‘Other’, more that 
it pertained to the rationale, scope and limits of appropriative and possessive license, and with it, of 
subjugation, control, containment, even destruction, of inconvenient, impeding, others.36 
 
What we find from this broader reading of the invention of ‘discovery’ as a philosophical moment 
is that before the rationalisation of the ‘Human’ in colonial-modern onto-epistemology is the prior 
assertion of the universal ‘natural right’ to appropriation. From this material context of encounter is 
the abstraction Human birthed as a foundational philosophical category. Philosophical 
deliberations on the ‘(in)humanity’ of Indian ‘humans’ cannot be understood therefore in isolation 
from the the appropriative desires of the ‘discoverers’ to secure the unfettered entitlements of 
‘travel’ and ‘trade’ (and of course, for good justificatory measure to preach God’s word through 
the King’s guns and swords); seen in this light, the universal ‘rights to hospitality’ – in its sanitized 
articulation - is more accurately understood as a particular duty to subjugation. Not any sublime 
quest for some universal metaphysical truth but the very mundane reason of right-ful appropriation 
ascribes originary meaning to the invention of the ‘Human’ of ‘Humanity’ so ‘discovered’: first is 
the foundational assumption and assertion of license of the imperial I,37 then is the rationalisation 
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of the vacuous category of the ‘Human’ who is thereby named and emplaced as the subject of 
governed-Beingness. Enrique Dussel’s correction of ego conquiro (the conquering I that precedes 
the sovereign I who thinks) to the Cartesian ego cogito is exactly to point here; the mythological I 
that ‘thinks’, of Euro-imperial philosophy, is founded upon the material I that conquered.38 A 
further philosophical invention completes the imperial manoeuvre: the assertion of ‘universality’ 
as a philosophical quality of Human-ity entrenches this trans-territorial Being of acquisition and 
possession, of Right, as the fount of the onto-epistemology of Human Beingness that founds and 
enforces the subsequent (b)ordering of the world as a World, named and possessed. We are indeed 
speaking here of the license of soverignty as the original act of acquisition/dispossession in the 
naming of (Non/In)Humanity.39  
 
We see therefore that from the early ontological debates on the question of the ‘Indios’, this act 
of intervention upon, and for, the ‘Human’, lies at the very origins of the so-called ‘humanist’ 
reason which subsequently finds evolution into the vocabulary of Human Rights as a universal and 
global technology of differentiated-(b)ordering.40 The ‘native-Indio’, as named by the ontological 
discoveries of philosophers, and subjugated by the violence of their ‘conquering-saviours’ (made to 
be, that is, into both philosophical and material ‘non-Being-ness’) is introduced into the ‘World’ 
precisely as the license of the conquering Human-I is asserted, affirmed, and normalized. Thus is 
the right of license the original ‘sovereign’ affirmation of differentiated being-ness that founds the 
philosophy of right-ed (In)Humanity, defining the (b)orders of license- appropriation, 
containment-subjectification, and abjection-abandonment. The subsequent future of right-ing the 
Human has since been all a variation, and a continuity, of this underlying reason of (b)ordering.  
 
2) The Birthing of Secular ‘Man’ and the (B)ordering of Territorialised ‘Citizens’. 
 
This coherence of the rationality of (b)ordering we see continued with the invention of ‘Man’ (as 
‘universal subject’) and ‘Citizen’ (as ‘territorialized subject’) of rights-obligations; this is familiar 
philosophical ground for Human Rights origin-stories. But I am not concerned here to re-trace 
the philosophical legacies of the so-called American and French Revolutions - as the celebrated 
iconic Events of the Enlightenment - on the idea of Human Rights. Important for my argument 
rather is how this philosophical move of Eurocentric colonial-modern onto-epistemology now 
structures the norm-ality of international (b)ordering as a totalised regulatory system for the global 
management of bodies-in-territory. Again, we see here the central role of the magical (Hu)Man in 
the operation of (b)ordering differentiated being-ness. 
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Rather than some revolutionary universal imagination of an emancipated-human, the philosophical 
invention of Man-Citizen produces a reified abstraction as political-legal subject, importantly now no 
longer as a being in a borderless geography under divinity but as territorialized under ‘sovereignty’; 
the ‘Enlightened’ Man-Citizen of rights originates and entrenches – to borrow from Zygmunt 
Bauman - a ‘transfixed’ imagination, which emplaces subject-beingness within bordered state 
territories, as a secular revisioning of a good order for a good society.41 Thus emerges as a norm-
ality into the World the onto-epistemology of Citizen as a secular political-subject constituted by 
Sovereign-Rights (in/as-territory), and of Man as a  metaphysical-subject constituted by Human-
Rights (in/as-property). Through the invention of Man-Citizen, therefore, is transfigured the 
‘believer-of–the-faith’ from the old (b)order of Christendom to the new of state-nationality, from 
the universality of the ‘global-divine’ to the particularity of the ‘territorialised-secular’, from the 
good Christian of the good God into the good Citizen-subject of the good (Sovereign) State, again, 
we recall, not as an actual in the world but as a reification, a malleable point of departure, a ‘zero 
point’ of colonial-modern philosophy, as ideal, as perfect.42 The abstraction serves a powerful 
function. As a rationality of governance-subjectification, the assignation of an abstract propertied-
possessive and possessed ‘subject’ enabled the creation of a new order, built upon an assertion of 
rational purity and perfection, an ideal of a new territorialized settlement of names and 
emplacements of inclusion/exclusion. But ideals aside (and whatever the motives of individual 
philosophers might have been, noble or otherwise) more specifically was constructed the original 
territorialized political-legal template for a global regulation of differentiated license, containment 
and abandonment. And this is crucial: Man and Citizen were inventions not of an insular 
imagination, but of an imperial one; they express the variegated conditions of right/lessness in the 
emergent colonial-modern capitalist State system.43  
 
When recounting the (European) story of the modern ‘nation-state’ - that state that is purportedly 
founded on the unshakeable ‘truths’ of the Rights of Man, and the ‘social contract’ - we speak in 
actuality of a colonial-modern formation within a totality of global coloniality; the exigencies of 
(b)ordering in this sense pertain to both 1) the differentiated subjectification internal to the 
colonial-modern territorialized state, and 2) the institutional architecture of a system of global 
differentiation. The two are co-constitutive and interdependent. It is important to stress this point 
to correct the conventional celebratory tellings of the revolutionary ‘European’-story as a tale in 
itself devoid its murderous colonial underside; contrary to the philosophical and geographical 
purity of most tellings of the story of ‘European’ thought, much of this ‘thinking’ took place fully 
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in the blood-soaked contexts of the trans-Atlantic slave-trade and the globalized routes and 
networks of imperial/colonial plunders. This is not new to our understanding: as Walter Rodney 
long ago made clear, Europe did indeed ‘underdevelop’ Africa,44 and as Walter Mignolo repeatedly 
reminds us, there would be no European ‘modernity’ (and its narratives of salvation) without global 
coloniality (and its materialities of negation, subjugation and appropriation).45 When understood 
as a global, as opposed to an insular-European historical formation, therefore, we see more clearly 
that the coeval actuality of Rights declared, and subjugation enforced, corresponds to a 
rationalization of a global structuring of difference. The assertion of propertied-rights (of 
conquest, appropriation, possession) for some and the ‘obligations’ on the inscribed-Other as 
conquered ‘Humanity’ to be made-‘subject’, this is the utter materiality of what Charles W. Mills 
brilliantly exposed as the ‘racial contract’; the ‘social contract’ so proudly the philosophical birth-
right of the ‘citizen’ being fully written with the blood of the racialized inflictions of the expropriation 
contract, the slavery contract and the colonial contract.46 With this understanding of the ‘norming of space’ 
as the ‘racing of space’,47 we might better describe the march of ‘progress’ that was the affirmation 
of the Rights of Man and the Citizen therefore as follows: the reified (Hu)Man of the 
Enlightenment was right-ed - as ‘citizen-subject’ - as a prize gained through the operation of the 
coloniality of subjectification-as-negation which ascribed as Non-Being (barbarian, savage, native, 
Black) the encountered ‘Other’ of Already-Being, the result of the operation of the ‘natural rights’ 
to name, enslave, subjugate, rape, lynch, murder, civilise, educate, develop, all in the name of 
universal (In)Humanity.48 Bluntly, Man/Citizen as abstract, universal, right-ed, philosophical-
beingness were philosophically birthed as actual embodied men, women and children were the 
world over subjugated if not entirely massacred. 
 
Thus was the modern ‘nation-state’ of territorialized sovereignty-subjectivity constituted 
philosophically and materially. And with it, were the normalities of coloniality-modernity invented, 
rationalised, institutionalized to enforce the ‘colonial difference’,49 the many worlds of Being 
violently transformed  into a ‘world-system’, its ‘borders’ drawn through ‘banalised’ violence – as 
Vivienne Jabri called it - to (b)order and regulate differentiated (post)colonial bodies within strictly 
enforced territorial cages.50 And we carry this ‘White Man’s’ legacy still as the ‘Black Man’s 
burden’.51  
 
3) The Globalisation of ‘International Human Rights Law’ and the Completion of the (Post)Colonial World 
System. 
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It is often the territoriality of global order and governance that provokes distress amongst Human 
Rights thinkers/actors as the promise of universality is perceived to be undermined by the 
discrimination of borders. And yet, as we have seen, the foundational traditions of dominant 
contemporary  Human Rights theology were precisely rooted in the territorial (b)ordering of 
differentiated ‘subjects’, their rationalized ascriptions of beingness the basis upon which gendered 
and racialized brutalities were norm-alised and enforced, as right. But this is not simply a telling of 
tales past, of the troubled (hi)story of Human Rights in its journey to post-colonial redemption. 
Quite the opposite, the materialization of the ‘post-colonial’ right to ‘self-determination’ - as the 
obligation to enforce a (b)ordered territorialised State – has proved fundamental to the norm-ing 
of global space as (b)ordered differentiation. The tragedy is that the ‘post-colonial’ world state 
system – in those many celebratory midnight hours heralded as ‘liberation’ from colonial, racist 
inhumanity - indeed marked the coming into full fruition of the process of colonial civil-isation.52  
 
The manufacture and coming into ‘independence’ of the territorialised ‘post/neo-colonial state’, 
with ‘privatised sovereignty’ - to become, as Achille Mbembe has termed the condition, a 
‘postcolony’ - reinforces and completes a global system designed to entrench the structural 
inequalities of imperial design.53 The philosophical invention of the ‘Human’ and of the idea of 
‘universality’, once explicitly founded on racialized differentiation, now are rejuvenated, their 
bloody pasts cleansed of their horrors and the material outcomes of impoverishment and 
enrichment thereby engendered now normalized as conditions of the ‘World’ rather than active 
processes of the World-made-such. In this, the ‘constitution’ of the post-colony – in the sense of 
its made-to be-ness – and of the ‘post-colonial’ demarcation of bodies-in-territory, serve to re-
inscribe anew a fully globalized, institutionally entrenched and enforced, differentiated regulation 
of license, containment and abandonment.  
 
Understood as a totality the conceptual register of Human/Citizen’s Rights is co-constitutive of 
this organization of the territorialized (b)ordering of differentiated subject-beingness. As we will 
see more fully later in the discussion, the regime of emplaced and bordered citizenship-with-rights 
serve crucially as a global neoliberal technology of dividing and ruling populations.54 In doing this, 
the constitutional function of the ‘international’ system of territorialised (b)ordering – as 
institutionalized by the UN Charter system and its attached Human Rights governance-
frameworks – is to enforce the basic architecture of a totalising regime for the differentiated 
subjectification of the global population, regulated in and through the discursive and material 
technologies of state-territoriality.55 And so does contemporary ‘International Human Rights Law’ 
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operate to settle the post-colonial present: it both enforces the prevailing order of rights as 
constructed, rationalized and regulated in time and place, as well as prescribes the 
presence/absence of those with(out) membership of belonging through the negotiation and 
redistribution of names and places as Being-subject. Though parochial and colonial in origins, the 
reason of Rights find useful translation therefore into the many particularised and contingent 
adaptation of its operation in the different times and places of Human-subjectification.56 The 
‘international’ politics of Human Rights ‘law’ is, in this respect, a politics of competing claims to 
define the borders of license, and the jurisdiction of containment and bans, outcomes of which, in 
terms of enforced rights and obligations in real-time and place, are determined by the jostling for 
power by competing state-private imperialist forces. ‘Superciliousness’ is precisely the point of this 
politics;57 the struggle for cross-cultural meanings and interpretations - for its Asian, African, 
Chinese, Islamic value-implications, for reservations and qualifications etc - can all be understood 
in this light as a contestation between competing imperial-capitals, for ‘rights’ of license and the 
‘obligations’ of protective containment and rationalizations of abandonment. Thus we see that the 
underlying reason of (b)ordering differentiation is not diluted by the various efforts to ‘de-
Europeanise’, or to ‘decolonise’ Human Rights, to bring about civilisational plurality within its 
substantive meanings. Quite the opposite, the  addition and mixing of the spices and herbs of 
exotic ‘post-colonial’ realms into the melting-pot of Human Rights serves the overarching cause 
well; the ascription of a pluriversal universality in this regard serves as a philosophical technique 
of global naturalisation and norm-alisation regardless of the ‘resistance’ motivations of many a 
post-colonial philosopher of Human Rights. We are all Human Rights-subjects now, subject to 
the naming and emplacing of subject-beingness. As such we me be contained with rights and 
obligations if we remain docile, obedient and worthy, but abandoned (even banned) to abject 
rightlessness if we are deemed not so.  
 
Human Rights thus defines the now, the who, and the how-to-be, of Human-ity, as constantly 
named, rationalized and (b)ordered. Agamben was correct therefore to see that the Rights of Man 
birthed the insidious and sophisticated technology of the biopolitical (colonial-)modern State (even 
if he was unable to see the colonial and territorial undersides of it), whereby are ‘citizenship’-‘ban’ 
precariously the existential conditions of political subject-beingness, in inclusion or exclusion.58 
Contra Agamben, however, the ‘decision’, that is the inscription of names and places as borders 
of the ‘political’, is not an undifferentiated act of ‘sovereignty’. I argue instead that the invention 
of ‘sovereignty’ – and I stress sovereignty as an invention, a philosophical rationalisation with no 
metaphysical essence, content, or materiality awaiting discovery or revelation - is precisely the 
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assertion and enforcement of the (b)ordering differentiated subject-beingness;59 the sovereign 
assertion does not create/decide ‘differentiation’ as the ‘exception’, rather the invention of 
‘sovereignty’ is the very norm-alisation of differentiated (b)ordering. In this connection, the reason 
of Human Rights co-responds to that of secular sovereignty; sovereignty – as a rationalisation of 
territoriality, and Human/Citizen’s Rights as a rationalisation of subjection combine to construct 
the norm-ality of global (b)ordering; together these inventions of colonial-modernity norm-alise the 
global institutionalization of regimes of appropriation, control and subjugation. This, I repeat, is 
not an aberration to an otherwise progressive postcolonial global order, it is not a betrayal of a 
possible post-colonial imagination of Human Rights defeated or betrayed, but is the very 
foundational reason for that order itself. There is no contradiction here. Indeed, post-colonial 
Human Rights are universally the concern of all, just as embodied human persons are, equally, 
wholly (potentially) disposable, surplus, irrelevant, subject to violence (always normalised) and 
abandonment (always rationalised).60 Her life, in this sense, is precisely ‘precarious’, not a result of 
cruel betrayal or appropriation, but in its very made-to-be-ness, as the very reason of being-subject.  
 
The Coherence of Perverse Facts. 
 
My argument in this essay is that, contrary to the common assumption that Human Rights pertains 
to the Humanity of the (venerable) vulnerable Human-subject, it is to construct and regulate the 
differentiated (b)orders of subject-beingness – of license, containment and abandonment - that 
the technology of Human Rights operates as a discursive instrument of governmentality, whatever 
the meta-political aspirations of critical philosophers of rights might be. This coherence of reason, 
I argue, is clear to witness in the perverse facts of inequalities, violence and neglect that beset the 
condition of (b)ordered human-beingness. 
 
1) The (B)ordering of Abandonment and Containment-Belonging. 
 
The conventional understanding might view Human Rights as expressing the underlying 
(aspirational) assertion of the (universal) ‘right’ of the Human-subject to belong, with dignity, at 
home in the world. But clearly this is not the actuality of Human Rights. Considerable disciplinary 
and regulatory anxiety thus is expressed regarding the fate of the abject abandoned-subject of 
rightlessness, for example, with regards the impact of ‘borders’ and ‘belonging’ on the Human 
Rights futures of ‘displaced’ persons. The question that dominates these deliberations can be 
simplified in the following terms: what are the effects of borders that separate Humanity into the 
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territorialised regimes of inclusion and belonging on the realisation of universal Human Rights, or 
more basically, on the Arendtian notion of the very ‘right to have rights’ itself? In apparent tension 
here are the separatist and exclusionary ‘political’ force of borders that operate to keep out, on the 
one hand, and the inclusionary 'cosmopolitan’ force of Human Rights, on the other. When 
understood through the perspective of (b)ordering however this apparent tension appears less a 
matter of opposing tendencies and more one of structural and systemic regulation; the discursive 
technology of Human Rights enable precisely this negotiation of (b)ordered inclusion and 
exclusion. 
 
Take the current ‘migrant/refugee crisis’ confronting the citadel that is ‘Europe’, a crumbling idea 
as it is even as it is all the more vigorously asserted and defended. As we witness the many bodies 
that, paying no heed to assertions of territorial inviolability, stream through the borders of Europe, 
we are reminded just how Human Rights is embedded to a global regime of territorialisation, and 
of how such territoriality renders meaningless the assertion of universal rights in the face of de-
territorialisation and displacement.61 There is no contradiction here. To be members of a shared 
Humanity with universal Human Rights in the world is not, we understand (for the ‘wretcheds of 
the earth’), to have the ‘right’ to share the same places of the world; this is all the more poignant 
given that the very original assertion of colonial license, as we have seen, was premised precisely 
on this ‘right’ to travel and the ‘duty’ to administer hospitality!  
 
But this act of exclusion, this abandonment through bans, is not however an act devoid the 
meticulous inscription of subject-beingness upon these abject bodies. Quite the opposite, banned 
bodies in movement remain subject to a totality of naming, to be inscribed with meaning, ascribed 
a condition of subject-beingness, all part of the (b)ordered totality of a regulated and enforced 
‘sphere of justice’,62 either performatively embraced as worthy-‘refugee’ to be assigned a place 
within the register of (Human)Rights, or denounced as unworthy-migrant, to be repulsed from 
entry, perversely ‘included’ into the register of names as abject, as banned-abandoned-rightless 
subject. What is critical in this understanding is that the fate of the ‘Human’ – as ‘refugee’ or 
otherwise – is not determined by an abstract, ethical judgement on the Humanity of the suffering 
Humans concerned; as Mark Franke rightly observed, “there is extraordinarily little discursive 
capacity within the contemporary theoretical debates on human rights to ever seriously entertain 
the rights of displaced persons as human rights.’63 Rather the actual fate of Human-beingness in 
its embodied particularity, as ‘subject’ (in whatever form, included or excluded), is always a 
contingency, an instrumental and consequential outcome of a governmental balancing of the 
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desires, pressures and exigencies of (b)ordering such that the stability of a territorialized order of 
bodies contained within differentiated territorial boundaries may be maintained. Put simply, the 
fact of Human Rights with regard the fate of the vulnerable migrant-subject is concerned primarily 
with the stable regulation of contained bodies in territory, not the suffering of human persons. 
 
So we see that the (b)ordering of exclusion and abandonment is simultaneously an operation of 
(b)ordering ‘belonging’; with every such ‘decision’ which names the ‘foreigner’, the ‘alien’, we see 
the biopolitical (b)orders of the constituted, contained, mythical ‘We’ (re)defined and reaffirmed. 
Exclusion-ban simultaneously gives meaning to inclusion-containment. The making-other, as 
differentiated from the reified subject of right-full belonging thereby performs the function of 
making-self of ‘national’ rights/obligations.64 In this way, being-Human-subject – in belonging and 
exclusions – is onto-epistemologically entwined with the constant (re-)‘constitution’ of the 
territorialised State and, simultaneously, of the colonial-modern State-system. Thus is enforced the 
perfected coloniality of a globalised regime of differentiated (b)ordering, of citizenship as a 
technology of ‘divide and rule’ to regulate the right-full/less places of differentiatedly named right-
full/less subjects. In all of this, the fate of the embodied human person is incidental to the broader 
reason of (b)ordering Humanity in differentiated being-ness.  
 
2) The (B)ordering of License-Privilege. 
 
We remind ourselves that whilst the ‘migrant/refugee’ crisis brings forth in public performance 
heated and urgent debates about naming those properly-belonging and those of fraudulent claim 
to universal Human Rights, at the same time are exemptional subjects (and the chains of capital, 
commodities and ‘services’ that attach to them) free to roam undisturbed across bounded 
territories, asserting and enjoying the old transterritorial ‘natural rights’ of license and ‘hospitality’. 
It is not that we are unaware of such operations and movements of the ‘global citizens’ of the 
world, of the ‘transnational capitalist class’ as Leslie Sklair named them some time ago.65 The 
privileged hyper-mobility of these subjects of license as they pass through ‘fast-track’ facilities of 
border-crossings has been plentifully documented; indeed for such privileged global travelers, 
borders clearly serve as facilitators of letting in and letting out.66 What Human Rights critics of such 
global inequalities often ignore however is that these analyses of differentiated and transterritorial 
mobilities reveal that structured differentiation is precisely the reason of regulation, not an 
aberration of some previous universal ideal of equality now betrayed. Even as the public discourse 
on borders repeatedly beat out affirmations and reconstructions of some reified ‘We’ of 
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mythologised ‘political belonging’, the material actualities of differentiated (b)orderings of subject-
beingness is everywhere otherwise enforced, and realised.67 On this point, much critical political-
legal thinking has obsessed with the reification of invented inscriptions of names – regarding, for 
example, on the meaning of the ‘subject’ of the ‘political’ - to the detriment of an interrogation of 
the facticity of (b)ordering,68 retaining the bounded-state still as its point of reference. Largely 
ignored in such sophisticated rearticulations of ruptural/excessive-subjectivity in contemplating 
the terrain of the ‘political’ have been the more mundane and empirical perspectives that see the 
‘disaggregation’ and ‘fragmentation’ of the state, and its configuration through the actual 
geographies of what Saskia Sassen has termed ‘global assemblages’.69 ‘Critical’ meditations on the 
‘subject’, on the ‘political’, seldom it seems burden themselves with the actualities of being subject-
in-the-world, of being subject-to-the-world. The question of relevance, I suggest, is not who is the 
‘subject’ of the ‘political’, as a philosophical abstraction, but rather who in actuality are the subjects 
of rights/lesness within (b)ordered states as they operate variously as particular (fractured and 
fractious) locales of the global.  
 
The actualities of being-subject, on the ground as it were, is that within the many locations of the 
global-in-(State)territory are the ‘natural-imperial’ rights of transterritorial license – to ‘trade and 
travel’ – the duty of territorial-national governmental technologies of States to negotiate, promote 
and enforce, no matter the ‘constitutional’ claims of inconvenient, precarious ‘citizens’. State-
enforcement, in conjunction with the manifold private ‘global law’ regimes of surveillance and 
adjudication, is critical here; whilst appearing to float amorphously over state-territorial (b)ordered 
jurisdictions, ‘global assemblages’, we note, remain entwined by the grounded state-territorial 
technologies of regulation and violence, their ‘fluid supraterritoriality’ hyper-dependent on the 
territorialised regimes and technologies of surveillance and policing for their ‘freedoms’.70 In the 
enforcement of such (b)ordered operation of ‘supraterritorial’ rights we find of little significance 
abstracted claims of ‘national’ political belonging. Quite the opposite, often what such 
enforcement entails is the protection of ‘transnational-others’ from ‘national-selves’; the increasing 
militarisation of controlling dissent against these assemblages of global license evidence in brutal 
starkness the material and experiential (b)ordering of actual friends and enemies, borders of the 
‘political’ notwithstanding.71 Arundhati Roy tells it plainly: 
 
‘All over the world, weak, corrupt local governments have helped Wall Street brokers, 
agribusiness corporations, and Chinese billionaires to amass huge tracts of land. (Of course 
this entails commandeering water too.) In India the land of millions of people is being 
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acquired and handed over to private corporations for “public interest” – for Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs), infra-structure projects, dams, highways, car manufacture, 
chemical hubs, ad Formula One racing. (The sanctity of private property never applies to 
the poor.)’72 
 
Such is the fact of Human Rights as a technology of enforcing differentiated subject-beingness. 
Whilst the cacophony of the many continued mythologized assertions of a bounded-nationalist 
‘We’ reverberate across polities against abject ‘immigrants’, the hyper-mobile, transterritorial 
‘foreign investor’ of license gains privileges and favours (Human Rights) often with little public 
scrutiny, their security of being and livelihoods enforced through regimes of private law in ways 
that far exceed those of national citizen-subjects who remain tethered by the rights and duties of 
constitutional-containment/ban;73 transnational capital it would appear is the true global citizen 
with universal ‘Human’ Rights! This, I venture, will be even so despite the electoral successes of 
the ‘take back control’ posturings of contemporary populist political figures of the so-called ‘(alt-
)Right’.  
 
So, this is the work of Human Rights to do. As a result precisely of its malleability and 
responsiveness, fully in its vacuousness, Human Rights enables precisely the enforcement of such 
differentiation of actual friends and enemies (rather than those fetishized by post-Enlightenment’ 
political-legal philosophy); for transnational capital to be accorded (Human) rights over national 
citizenry, we must understand, is the workings of universal Human Rights rightfully effected; the 
livelihoods of the most impoverished citizens sacrificed for ‘public’ purposes, equally so the 
rightful effecting of Human Rights governance: all is possible in the name of Human Rights, 
objections of activists or critical philosophers notwithstanding. Here is where the true ‘cunning’ 
of the State manifests,74 to balance and rationalize – and this no doubt is a political burden - the 
distribution of competing rights/lessness, transnational, national and local. Understood through 
the mythology of the universal Humanity of the Human subject, such seemingly perverse 
privileging of the elite desires of transnational capital over the vulnerable fates of human subjects, 
might appear as a betrayal of the reason of Human Rights. Understood through the reason of 
(b)ordering, however, we see that differentiation is the coherent function of the very assertion of 
the universality of Human Rights.  
 
3) The (B)ordering of Fear-Vulnerability, Violence. 
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Much Human Rights anxiety, we know, follows the apparent totalitarianism of the contemporary 
discourse and violent practices of ‘global security’ and the now all pervasive ‘war on terror’. The 
rationalities of a global ‘government of unease’, as Didier Bigo calls it,75 are seen as compromising 
long-standing Human Rights values of privacy, fair trial, freedom of movement, freedom of 
expression, freedom from torture etc. Here, the assumed novelty, the new, that so worries the 
critical Human Rights thinker-practitioner, is that the subject and geography of securitisation 
exceeds the limits of constitutional-territorial jurisdictions and their rights-protections to operate 
instead as a global domain of surveillance, enforcement and biopolitical governmentality.76 Our 
reading enables a different understanding of the operation of Human Rights in the government of 
unease; the management of risk precisely describes the rationality of (b)ordering that this entails. 
Critically, the reified subject of Rights serves as the discursive referent, even alibi, for this 
enforcement of biopolitical regulation. With the discursive and material inscriptions of threat upon 
‘dangerous’ or ‘suspect’-subjects of exclusion-ban, are the mythical vulnerable subject of Rights, 
as a zero-point of governmentality, assured ‘protection’ in inclusion, from fear (through violence, 
if necessary).77  
 
We see this recourse to the vulnerable Human as alibi for the global (b)ordering of violence clearly 
in the discourse on ‘humanitarian intervention’, relabeled as the ‘responsibility to protect’, with its 
emphasis on ‘Human Security’.78 The concern for ‘vulnerable’ populations is now a centre-piece 
of global security action, their rescue from the precarious polities of ‘fragile/failing’ states, 
incumbent upon the civilized to oversee;79 sovereignty now less an impediment, its sharing, as 
responsibility, a reconceptualisation towards humanisation.80 For well-meaning protagonists, the 
Human Rights assumption here is that with such prioritisation of ‘human security’ might, 
hopefully, rightfully, the vulnerable Human subject be the focus of global solidarity. This more so 
with the ‘war on terror’ rationalisation – unsupported by empirical evidence it would appear – that 
such ‘fragile’ states provide fertile grounds for rampant transnational evil.81 The other side of the 
story, one less enthralled by the ‘late-modern’ cosmopolitan embrace of the Human Rights of 
vulnerable-Humanity, however, are the manifold analyses which see in these assertions of Human 
Rights the familiar expressions of imperial desire, and control.82 Seen through the lens that I 
present here, we again see coherence rather than contradiction: rationalisations of global 
‘responsibility’ - to ‘protect the rights of others’ – enable the enforcement of the differentiated 
(b)ordering of ‘desirable’ and ‘dangerous’ subjects through the global regulation of territorial 
containment.83  
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Caroline Holmqvist is both correct and mistaken: 
 
‘Political imagination, as we have seen is conditioned by spaciality. The shifting of special 
imagination from linear statism to globality and supraterritoriality has involved a 
fundamental upheaval of political relationships and the way in which political agency is 
imagined. Only in light of this can we understand the evolution of such counter-intuitive 
ideas as that of military intervention (war) (re)establishing the social contract in another state, 
on behalf of another people – an idea, of course, that has very little in common with classical 
understandings of a social contract between state and citizen.’84  
 
Whilst it is true that that we are witnessing an ever greater assertion of globality in defining the 
‘space’ of political imagination’ – at least with respect to reasons of ‘security’ even if not distributive 
justice85 – there is nothing ‘counter-intuitive’ about this fact of globality; the neoliberal operation 
of global policing through the operationalization of Human Rights makes complete sense. The 
error here, as is so often the case, is an assumption of the truth of the ‘social (racial) contract’ as 
the basis of political belonging within a bounded (Enlightened-)state. When the actuality of the 
state is differently understood as a contingent space of contested global (b)ordering then the 
coherent reason of imposing ‘on behalf of another people’ in a distant territory the policing 
strictures, and structures, of a reformulated, reconstituted ‘social/racial contract’ of 
Human/Citizen’s rights, becomes plain to see. ‘Security’ and ‘development’ indeed are ideologies 
and technologies of ‘pacification’.86  
 
The function of the state as a constituted spatial unit within a global framework of the 
territorialized regulation of subject-bodies, is first and foremost to contain regulated subjects within 
its enclosed space; through such management of contained bodies may the right-full license of 
transterritoriality may be facilitated. The regulation and management of bodies kept-in and of 
bodies let-out, therefore, is the fundamental obligation/responsibility of post-colonial ‘sovereignty’ 
as a global administrative and regulatory technology. Effective/good states (as opposed to 
‘weak/failing/fragile’ ones) are ones that are able to enforce and maintain the (property-)rights-
regime of license/containment/bans of subject-beings within their territory - these then would be 
the ‘good neighbourhoods’ of Mary Kaldor’s vision of human security;87 good/desirable subjects 
are, in turn, those that remain, with their ascribed names within their ascribed places in these ‘good 
neighbourhoods’ (territories/states) as compliant, self-disciplining, entrepreneurial agents of 
neoliberal capitalism.  
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In this respect, the greatest failure of the (postcolonial) ‘sovereign’ state is to fail in this function 
of the regulation and containment of bodies in rights and rightlesness; the spill-over of emplaced 
and named subjected-bodies (as citizen) out of their regulatory-territorial cages as dangerous 
subjects (as  ‘migrant’, ‘refugee’, ‘terrorist’ etc) signals the primary indicator of the ‘failed state’. 
Against such failure must action, for ‘security’ and Human Rights, be undertaken at the level of the 
‘human terrain’. 88  And as Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell explain, it is precisely to regulate 
the human terrain that ‘human security’ serves effectively as a ‘principle of formation’ and a 
‘relation of governance’.89 Rather than an aberration of an international system of non-intervention 
and co-existence, we now witness the enforcement, as a totality, of a globalising morality of 
normality and deviance, of ‘development’, ‘health’ and ‘disease’, in order that desirable liberal 
subjects (of rights) may be secured from the dangerous subjects of some pathological violent 
intent. Security in this imaginary thus equates with the administration of what Michael Dillon and 
Julian Reid term ‘global triages’ against the ‘emergency’ of dangerous emergence; ‘[g]lobal triage 
specifies who gets what treatment, where, when and how.’90 This as a rationality of a global security 
imagination, transcending the perceived limitations of territorial jurisdictional borders, a matter 
now for global surveillance and policing; the ‘border’ of differentiated subject-beingness, we now 
know, is defined less by nationalised territorial registers, more by a general globalized, and 
subnationalised, corporeal biopolitics of desirable and undesirable subjects of Rights/lessness.91 
By such biopolitical borders are the actualities of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, rights and rightlessness, 
marked within the good and bad neighbourhoods of ‘sovereign’ orders.92 
 
In all this we see that the semantics of the ‘protection’, and ‘development’, of the vulnerable 
Human-subject continue to rationalise to a global ‘security’ imagination that is still concerns the 
(b)ordering of the rights to license against the threats of contained/banned subjects. It is so now 
as it always was, as Anthony Pagden demonstrates: the origins of ‘humanitarian imperialism’ are 
found in the following fundamental ‘natural rights’: ‘1) the right to preemptive strike, 2) the right 
to the use of “vacant” lands, and 3) the right to punish those who transgress the law of nature.’93 
Intervention for human security, for State-building and ‘development’,  for the protection of the 
‘vulnerable’ Human-subject, for the policing and surveillance of desirable and dangerous subjects, 
serve now as the contemporary rationality and vocabulary for the old discipline of the coloniality 
of ‘civilisation’.94  
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To conclude the discussion in this section, this I stress: what we learn from these examples of the 
perverse coherence of the ‘facts’ of rights(lesness) is that Human Rights must be understood within 
a broader reason of differentiated (b)ordering. Contrary to conventional readings, the construction 
of differentiated subject-beingness is not an exception, the result of Human Rights perverted, not 
a paradox of Human Rights effected, not a perplexity of Human Rights imagined. Exactly the 
opposite, Human Rights functions coherently, in its indeterminacy and its contingencies, to 
(re)make us differently-subject in our metaphysical equality; it provides the ‘universal’ 
rationalisation of a territorially-managed and enforced ‘constitutionalisation of inequality’, as 
Stephen Gill so aptly put it.95 From the coherent reason of territorial inclusion/exclusion and the 
differentiated mobility of license and abjection, to the material and discursive (b)ordering of 
biopolitical ‘human security’, Human Rights we see enable the distribution of names and 
emplacements of license, containment and ban, to regulate the differentiated subject-beingness of 
the ‘transnational capitalist classes’, the ‘national citizen-subjects’ and the ‘denationalised abject-
subjects’ of the world.  
 
Conclusions and Openings. 
 
To argue that Human Right must be understood as co-constitutive of a reason of (b)ordering is 
not to suggest that many an emergence and recognition of ‘rights’ as settlements of govern-ment 
in here-and-now legal articulations have no foundations in experiences of suffering and struggle.96 
In this respect, the ‘Human’ of Human Rights might well serve as a biopolitical field of contestation 
for recognition and (re)distribution of names and emplacements – as citizen/legal alien/illegal 
alien etc.97 Room for negotiation, for ‘responsiveness’, might thereby indeed be available within 
the territorialised regimes of biopolitical governmentality, spaces for deliberative negotiation and 
settlement might therefore be opened up by resort to the presumed ‘democratic iterations’ of an 
engaged and informed public, as Seyla Benhabib would like to believe.98 The point that I wish to 
stress is that responsiveness and adaptability to manage and re-settle the distribution of names and 
emplacements is precisely the work of Human Rights as a technology of containment to do; the 
contingent inscriptions of subject-beingness operate within regimes of naming that define the 
parameters and scope for renegotiation, for re-counting the present of those present and those 
absented. This is to say that prior to the articulation of (any) ‘rights’ as expressed in actual ‘political-
time’ and registered in ‘political-history’, even in their disruptive, ‘dissensual’, and pluriversalistic 
emergence, exist already the containing and constraining regulatory norm-ality from whence the 
right is/can be thought and asserted; rights are thus already particularly constructed artefacts of a 
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negotiated settlement of ‘containment’, and as such, are constrained by the regimes of reasons (of 
containment) so (b)ordered. This being so, the specific ‘names’ and ‘places’ of subject-beingness 
may indeed be granted altered recognition through the politics for Human Rights – the once 
abandoned (or banned) may indeed become ‘recognised’ and ‘included’ – but they remain 
nevertheless precariously-subject, and subjugated, to the underlying rationale of appropriative 
license through the inevitable application of the politics of Human Rights.99 This is less a scene of 
rupture, more of pacification. Let us take an example, one that is often spoken of in terms of a 
ruptural Human Rights becoming: that of the ‘undocumented worker’. 
 
The error is to confuse the ‘undocumented’ as being non-subject, inexistent. Following this 
ontological presumption of (non-)beingness, the re-inscription of subject-beingness from one 
category of being-subject (undocumented) to another (worker) is then mistaken as a rupture of 
categories of subject-beingness themselves; Anne McNevin’s appeal to have recognised 
‘transnational labour citizenship’ as a category of ‘political belonging’ is an example of this error.100 
I understand it differently. The reorganization/redistribution of contained subject-beingness, 
rather than the rupture of categories of subjugation – from non-being/inexistence to 
becoming/being-subject – is effected by this maneuver of reinscription; the ‘worker/transnational 
labour’ (subject to ‘regularisation’ and ‘documentation’) remains a normality into which the 
particular subject-in-exclusion (undocumented) may be re-inscribed anew as differently-subject, 
contained again within the totality of differentiated (b)ordered being-ness. An examination of the 
simple bureaucracy of ‘recognition’ reveals this operation of re-subjectification: first, the 
unpredictable, uncontrolled, uncontained articulation and manifestation of struggle is 
domesticated through the ascription of ‘undocumented-worker’ as the transitional category of 
subject-beingness; then is the renegotiated status of subject-beingness into the contained (though 
now expanded) category ‘worker’ approved and re-cognised (or not) through the processes of the 
submissions of documentary applications and registrations, in itself a ritiualistic re-enactment of a 
‘sovereign’-decision of inscription and emplacement. Far from rupture, this points to a 
resettlement, a reaffirmation, of containment. 
 
Whatever the ‘authorial’ background therefore, and accepting that the ghosts of many an insurgent 
community of struggle haunt contemporary registers of Rights, my argument is that the inscription 
of Rights upon a subjectified Human – that is to say  when human struggles against dispossession 
and subjugation become translated into the semantics and grammar of rights - enables a regulatory 
procedure of (b)ordering and governmentality; such ‘recognition’ of ‘rights’ so articulated pertain 
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precisely to the space of the ‘political’ as a (b)ordered domain that defines the shifting boundaries, 
terms and conditions of belonging. As the ‘recognition’ of rights enables a name and place of 
belonging, so does it domesticate and contain such subject-beingness.101  
 
Therefore, we see that for all the attempts to recover an insurgent meaning and reason for Human 
Rights, a politics for Human Rights is entirely consistent with, and encapsulated within, a reason of 
governmentality when viewed through the lens of license and containment/ abandonment. More 
than this, the politics for Human Rights is further open to substantive ambiguity. As we so often 
see, such radical assertions of right could equally be for the benefit of dominant power 
configurations as might they be for subaltern insurrections;102 the force with which radical, Trade-
Related, Market-Friendly Human Rights transformations are operationalised for the benefit of the 
transnational capital is evidence of this, as Baxi’s own analysis concedes.103 This is no accident. 
What appears as the paradoxes of territoriality, governmentality and parochiality are the workings 
of Rights in the world, they are the actual substantive content of Rights as the (b)orders of license, 
containment and ban are constantly administered and re-negotiated toward a resettlement. No 
doubt there will be many occasions when the indeterminacy of Human Rights may well come to 
assist within the political frames of the redistribution of names, places, and consequently, 
resources. In this, the progressive Human Rights thinker/practitioner will win some battles, and 
lose some others. This is not my dispute. All I suggest is that we see this domain of Human Rights 
for what it is, and for that, to understand that such a domain of govern-ment will remain defined 
by the calculations of differentiated (b)ordering. Simply, the translation of the insurgent, 
mobilisational politics for Human Rights into the techno-bureaucratic and juridical politics of 
Human Rights – a necessary incorporation if the intention is for inclusion/recognition-as-subject – 
proves to be the domestication of dissent, the disciplining of imagination, the settlement of 
(im)possibilities, within always a differentiated reality of unequal subject-beingness. This is what 
Human Rights do. Without perplexity, we observe a wholly coherent and rationalized operation 
of differentiated (b)ordering. 
 
But to understand the reason and operation of Human Rights thus as a technology of (b)ordering 
is not to limit the imagination of human futures, is not to negate the spirit of human hope. A 
different thinking, less preoccupied with machinations of the politics of/for Human Rights and 
more grounded on the actualities and vocabularies of human struggles, may be pursued. My 
intention here is to suggest a return of the focus of philosophies of refusal and resistance to the 
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necessary struggle of overturning the categories of (b)ordering that configure global coloniality. I 
conclude by briefly outlining such an anti-colonial philosophical orientation. 
 
Two truths prevail: first, despite the valiant efforts of (pluriversal) Human Rights imaginations, the 
infinite problems of human suffering the result of inflicted cruelty remain prevalent and 
unresolved; secondly, regardless of the proliferation of (disappointed) Human Rights discourse, 
communities of struggle persist in their incessant refusal to abide by the extant (b)orderings of the 
World. Human Rights, in other words, neither saves human being-ness, nor does it exhaust other 
possible imaginations of resistance and refusal. From these two truths of violence and struggle 
might a different direction for philosophy be discerned. 
 
We have seen that the essential operation of Human Rights is to regulate and enforce the 
coloniality of categories of differentiated subject-beingness. To be subject, therefore, is to be 
subject to precisely these categories of differentiation. Whilst the semantics of Rights might, 
through ‘inclusion’, provide instances of existential reprieve from here and now desires of violence 
and appropriation, we see that the coloniality of power-being remains intact to this redistribution 
of containment-abandonment. This, as I have argued, perpetuates the politics of norm-ality and 
normalization. Against this I suggest a shift from the semantics of rights to a semantics of struggle, 
which recovers, as an anti-colonial affirmation, a philosophy of desubjectification.   
 
By an anti-colonial philosophical orientation I mean to take as a point of departure not the 
possibility of becoming-subject into the categories of Human-beingness, but de-subjectification as a 
refusal of the coloniality of categories.104 Bearing in mind that the semantics of rights is a framing 
of being within the ‘political-legal’ (b)orders of subject-beingness, the semantics of struggle, in this 
regard, is a semantics precisely of refusal, even ‘illegality’, which de-name and de-normalise the 
colonial-modern categories of license/containment/bans as inscribed through the enforcements 
of Human Rights/lessness. If colonial philosophies begin with the given-ness of the names and 
categories of (Non)Being as ‘discovered’, and thereby, of the onto-epistemologies of becoming-
being into the World as given, anti-colonial philosophies begin with the assertion of a being-
otherwise, an otherwise to and regardless of – in its full sense of being without regard to – the  
given inscriptions of names that have become normalized as (b)ordered artefacts of coloniality.  
 
Such an orientation does not point to a philosophy of inclusion, it does not aspire for a struggle 
for a ‘name’ within the registers of ‘government’ in the ‘political’ space and its various places; the 
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ascriptions of such names rather is beside the point.105 Contrary to a politics for Human Rights - 
for the ‘recognition’ of beingness as ‘subject’ - an anti-colonial philosophy, grounded upon the 
semantics of struggle as an articulation of desubjectification, is derived from the conscious 
insurgency of grounded and emplaced refusals of subjection and affirmations of being otherwise 
than enforced. To take seriously the labours of ‘epistemic disobedience’ – as Walter Mignolo calls 
for106 - therefore entails the burden to think from the other-side of the colonial-divide against the 
domestication of subjectification (ie of the making-subject-being within colonial categories of 
human-beingness) to reclaim, as an anti-colonial assertion, names of being-non-subject against 
colonial-naming.  
 
This undoubtedly cannot be a philosophy of the abstract, thought in the abstract, rather it is a lived 
philosophy of refusal, or to borrow from the insurgent thought-practice of the South African 
Abahlali baseMjondolo (AbM) shack-dwellers movement, it is a philosophy of a ‘living politics’.107 
What is critical here is to not make the categorical error that to be non-subject is to be non-being, to 
remember that before and beyond the philosophical categories of human-beingness that we take 
as given (containing in their very DNA the coloniality of power/being), are ‘other’ 
philosophoscapes of being that already are, persistent in their co-eval presence with colonial 
subjectification; these are affirmation of ‘We are’ as exemplified by so many articulations of 
insurgent refusals that have the audacity to proclaim,  ‘we don’t ask for anyone’s permission’.108 
And this is precisely to point: the refusal of the authority to ‘permit’! We remember after all that 
the names of the World as we purportedly know it, that we are instructed to know it as/by, are 
only normalized through the self-affirmed ‘sovereign’ author-ity of (post)colonial regimes of 
government as rationalized by philosophers of global coloniality. This was the original colonial 
conceit, to presume to name and emplace the World. And it remains thus merely invention; for all 
the normalized, banalised violence of this World, notwithstanding its hugely destructive militaristic 
might, these (b)orders of enforced differentiated beingness remain entirely precarious upon the 
force of its self-assertion and philosophical normalization. From this self-asserted authority, 
invented and rationalized by philosophies of (post)colonial ‘Right’, are ‘permissions’ of 
(differentiated) beingness granted through inscriptions and ascriptions of names and places of 
being. Thus the significance of the anti-colonial refusal: we don’t need anyone’s permission. 
 
A semantics of struggle therefore retains the anti-colonial encounter as a situation of 
incommensurability, its resolution coming not from inclusion into the (post)colonial registers of 
revised subject-names - of having recognised a right/obligation-to-be-in-the-World - but from their 
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dissolution. Perhaps it is precisely this refusal to be made-subject to the (b)orders of inflicted 
license, containment/abandonment, and the destruction of the coloniality of categories, that 
portends the possibility of decolonisation wherein human futures of diverse beingness remain, as 
such, both already present and unforetold, neither enabled nor foreclosed by the imaginations or 
the semantics of Human Rights. Such an understanding of anti-colonial philosophies of struggle 
unfortunately does not promise the (false) comforts (and suffer from the dismay of perceived 
failures) of Human Rights-declaratory assertions of universal humanity moving ever towards some 
redeemed future to come. But for that it perhaps more accurately reflects the necessary unfinished 
labour of anti-colonial philosophies to to de-name the World, and to re-name/make worlds 
otherwise. What is to follow remains, as always, unknowable. 
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